Relocating Asylum Seekers out of Europe is Not Working

Other European countries had shown great interest in these ‘innovative’ solutions, waiting to know the outcome in order to possibly follow the same strategy for migrants under their jurisdiction.

But what has become of those projects? What costs have they had or are they having? Have they been implemented? Did they actually represent a viable alternative for the management of migratory flows arriving in Europe?

The UK-Rwanda plan and the Italy-Albania protocol were heralded as innovative solutions, but their real-world execution shows significant failings.

The UK-Rwanda Plan and Italy-Albania Protocol: Premature Failures

UK-Rwanda Plan:

The UK government, under Rishi Sunak, finalized a deal with Rwanda in 2022 to transfer migrants arriving from the English Channel. Despite an update approved in January 2024, the plan only managed to relocate four migrants voluntarily to Kigali, costing taxpayers £290 million. Following Keir Starmer’s Labour victory in July 2024, the plan was scrapped.

Italy-Albania Protocol:

Italy signed a protocol with Albania in autumn 2023, aiming to build three centres in Albania for identifying and relocating asylum seekers rescued by the Italian Navy. However, timelines and costs remain unclear, and the project has been delayed multiple times. Italy has yet to provide definitive dates for when the transfers will begin.

Logistical Problems: Delays and Uncertainty

The construction of the centres, initially expected to be completed by May 2024, has been fraught with delays. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had announced several opening dates — first May, then August — but as of September, there are no confirmed indications on when the centres will be operational.

The deployment of 12 Italian prison officers to Albania, initially planned for July, was delayed to at least August due to the unfinished construction of a 20-person prison that is part of the project. These officers are currently undergoing training, but there are no clear instructions on when and where they will be sent, as the prison itself is not yet built.

Operational Challenges: Staffing and Training Gaps

The centres in Albania are meant to hold migrants from „safe“ countries, as determined by the Italian government, and process their asylum applications within 28 days. These cases are likely to be rejected, leaving the migrants in administrative detention while their asylum requests are processed. However, full jurisdiction over these centres is still uncertain.

To cope with the expected influx of asylum claims, the Italian government expanded the 18th section of the civil court in Rome, which handles such cases. Nonetheless, the additional judges required have yet to be appointed, and if workloads prove too high, judges from other sections—who lack immigration expertise—may be brought in. These judges would need to undergo fast-track training, which has yet to begin.

In May 2024, the Italian Ministry of the Interior recruited 45 officials to handle asylum applications, at a cost of €1.8 million for 2024, and €2.2 million per year for 2025 and 2026. However, these officials were not selected for their expertise in immigration, and many came from unrelated sectors, such as the Ministry of Labour. This lack of specialization could lead to delays and errors in processing claims, and the necessary training for these officials has also been postponed.

Staffing Shortages and Space Issues

Only 23 out of the 45 appointed officials were in service by mid-2024. The remaining recruits either declined the position or resigned after realizing the complexity of the job. Two new sections in the Rome territorial commission have been established to handle the Albania-related cases, but there isn’t enough space in the existing offices. As a result, new staff are working from offices of the Ministry of the Interior.

According to trade unionist Adelaide Benvenuto, the situation is unsustainable for existing staff. Training is complex, and the high turnover of personnel has created instability. Additionally, the validation of detention decrees, normally handled by trained judges, may now fall to judges with insufficient immigration experience, risking procedural errors that could allow rejected asylum seekers to appeal.

Conclusion: Uncertain Outcomes and Legal Risks

Despite the Italian government’s assurances, there are still significant uncertainties regarding both the final cost and timeline for completing the centres in Albania. Humanitarian organizations have expressed concerns that these plans may violate national, European, and international legal protections for asylum seekers.

The failure of the UK-Rwanda plan, combined with the unresolved challenges of the Italy-Albania protocol, highlights the inefficacy of these deportation strategies. Rather than replicating these flawed models, European governments should shift their focus towards a collaborative migration management system that respects legal obligations and ensures equitable burden-sharing across EU member states.