At the conclusion of the informal European Council meeting in Dublin on 13 November, it was announced that the EU had formed a team of negotiators who would represent the Union in future negotiations on Ukraine. Specifically, the Summit of Heads of State and Government decided to entrust a team of national security advisers from five Member States — the so-called ‚E5‘ format comprising France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom — together with the equivalent advisers to the President of the European Council, António Costa, and the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, with representing the European position at the negotiating table on Kyiv’s future. Their counterparts will be representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the United States. While this may seem like good news, it is not, for various reasons.

First and foremost, the formation of a seven-member negotiating delegation is not good news, as they will be sitting at a table with representatives from Moscow and Washington, as well as Vladimir Zelensky’s envoys, who will already have a clear idea of the strategy to pursue in the negotiations. However, to define its official position, the European delegation will first have to reach an agreement amongst no fewer than seven participants, one of whom is from outside the EU. These participants have differing views on how the situation in Ukraine should unfold, and their respective national public opinions are currently far from united in supporting Kyiv’s position regarding the ongoing conflict. In other words, the European negotiators will need to hold internal ‚pre-negotiations‘ to decide the EU’s official position at the negotiating table, and this will have to happen every time one of the counterparties puts forward a proposal. Good luck with that.

Secondly, this is not good news, as the governments of at least three of the countries involved in the delegation are approaching the end of their terms of office. Between April and November 2027, elections will be held in France, Italy and Poland, and the political scenarios regarding the preferences of their respective electorates are highly uncertain. There is a real possibility of changes in the ruling majorities in these three countries, which raises a serious question: what value could the positions expressed by Paris, Rome or Warsaw have in the negotiations over the coming months, if politicians from different parties were to win the elections in 2027? How binding would the terms negotiated up to that point be if the new heads of state or government, legitimised by the French, Italian or Polish popular vote, were to pursue different approaches to dealing with Russia’s and Ukraine’s claims regarding the conflict? At best, almost everything would have to be reset and started from scratch, wasting the time and effort invested up to that point, while the conflict would most likely continue to cause casualties and destruction.

Thirdly, this is not good news because the decision to assemble a delegation comprising solely national security advisers, while keeping government representatives in the background — at least for the time being — inevitably limits the authority of the European team. While it is clear that the technical composition of the delegation aims to avoid the conflicts that a purely political delegation might trigger, it is equally evident that any proposal put on the table will require the approval of the relevant European ministries, as well as the offices of the Council and Commission presidencies, in order to authorise the technical experts to continue the negotiations. This will inevitably lead to weakness and delay in the negotiations, prolonging the suffering of the populations affected by the war.

The fourth and most significant reason why the strategic decision made by the European Council is unfavourable is not only related to the fate of Ukraine, but also, and above all, to the future of European governance in the realm of foreign policy. The EU Treaties expressly provide for a figurehead with the authority to sit at a negotiating table concerning the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who leads the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. Since 1 December 2024, this post has been held by Kaja Kallas, the former Prime Minister of Estonia. According to the treaties, the High Representative is responsible for coordinating and implementing the EU’s diplomatic and security strategies. Nevertheless, the European Council has decided to exclude her from a seven-member delegation, five of whose participants are representatives of individual EU member states, which is tasked with safeguarding European interests in a bloody conflict that has raged for almost five years on the EU’s borders.

It is no secret that Kallas is openly hostile to the conditions that Moscow has leaked as a prerequisite for ending the conflict. However, allowing Russia to annex the eastern Ukrainian regions, demilitarising the rest of Ukraine and restoring the European order that existed prior to the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 — when negotiations began that led to Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia joining in 1999 and the Baltic states in 2004 — is not something that someone representing a country like Estonia could easily accept. This was all well known in Brussels by the end of 2024, when Kallas was appointed and the war in Ukraine had been raging for over two and a half years. So why was Kallas entrusted with such a delicate task at that time, given the gravity of the ongoing conflict and his understandable personal involvement, given his national background? If the intention was to prevent a hardening of stance from someone responsible for representing the EU’s foreign and security policy positions, perhaps a different candidate should have been chosen instead of the former Estonian Prime Minister.

However, the decision to remove Kallas from the European delegation now confirms her definitive loss of legitimacy. With what authority can she continue to represent European positions in other areas of negotiation when Brussels, Berlin, Paris, Rome and Warsaw have decided to leave her at home while they negotiate an end to a devastating conflict for the Ukrainian people that is also crucial to European interests? Kallas is well known to be deeply disliked by Putin, and her exclusion was probably a concession made to Moscow to ensure that the negotiating table was convened at all. However, it is equally clear that acceding to the wishes of the conflict’s main instigator places the European delegation in an obviously subordinate position, given that the Russian president has been allowed to choose his own negotiating partners. This is not exactly a demonstration of firmness — an indispensable quality for successful negotiations. In other words, Kallas‘ exclusion reflects a lack of confidence in her abilities and undermines the governance of the Union’s foreign and security policy. What is the point of being the High Representative for the CFSP if someone else is sent to negotiate at decisive moments?

While we wait for the outcome of the negotiations, one thing is certain: the EU no longer has a unified stance on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is despite years of Brussels, Berlin, Paris and Rome emphasising the importance of the Union speaking with one voice when its security is at stake. Despite the reassurances given to Zelensky by Costa and von der Leyen, the United States and Russia are undoubtedly delighted by this fragmented European representation, as they can now negotiate with a delegation that is weaker than their own. Henry Kissinger used to joke about the EU by sarcastically asking for the telephone number to find out the European position. For the Ukraine negotiations, Trump and Putin are now being given a list of at least seven numbers to choose from. Who knows which number they will call?

Andrea De Petris is Scientific Director of the European Policy Centre Italy and Assistant Professor in Comparative Public Law at the University of Rome.

In addition to the analysis of European legislation, he deals with migration law, comparative legal systems, electoral law and forms of political participation. He has published over 100 contributions on comparative law, and has been a Fulbright Research Fellow at the University of California, Irvine, and DAAD Stipendiat at the Universities of Düsseldorf and Berlin.

 

 


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