Transatlantic Tech Tango: Dealing with Monopolists and Security Post-2024

As Americans go to the polls in one of the most consequential elections in recent history, the European Union (EU) is watching with keen interest and cautious anticipation. The stakes are high, not only for the United States (US) but for the global community, and in particular for the transatlantic relationship that has historically shaped international policies and alliances. Understandably, the European Commission has been preparing for various outcomes in recent months, including the possible return of a Trump presidency, which previously introduced a series of tariffs affecting key industries such as steel, aluminium, and the automotive sector. The reintroduction of such tariffs could have a significant economic impact, potentially sparking a trade war that would weigh on an already fragile global economy.

But regardless of who emerges victorious this week, the EU must remain steadfast in prioritising a strong transatlantic partnership. The geopolitical landscape has become increasingly complex, with tensions rising from China’s assertive foreign policy and Russia’s continued aggression in Eastern Europe. The United States will remain the EU’s most important security ally, notably through NATO. In this context, it’s important to consider what the election means for EU digital policy, an area at the intersection of economic interests, security concerns, and democratic values.

This brief essay argues that focusing on key areas where interests overlap and there is potential for bipartisan support in the US can pave the way for future cooperation, whatever the outcome of the election. Two such areas stand out: competition policy towards Big Tech and the security dimension of technology infrastructure. By focusing on these areas, the EU can work with the US to develop coordinated strategies to address common challenges, such as market monopolisation by technology giants and vulnerabilities in critical digital infrastructure, which is vital for both economic stability and technological sovereignty.

The Battle for Digital Market Fairness

The Biden administration’s adoption of the “New Brandeisian” approach – a reference to Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, known for his progressive stance on antitrust issues – marked a clear shift in the US approach to antitrust enforcement, particularly with respect to Big Tech companies such as Amazon, Google (Alphabet), Facebook (Meta), Microsoft, and Apple. This shift cannot be overstated, as it finally aligns US policy more closely with the EU’s long-held ordoliberal positions on tech antitrust issues. For years, the EU and US have lacked common ground in this area, often due to fears of protectionism, with the US accusing the EU of unfairly targeting American companies, and disagreements over whether policies were protecting competitors rather than promoting competition itself. The appointment of Lina Khan, a prominent critic of Amazon’s market dominance, as chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) signalled a willingness on part of the US to aggressively challenge monopolistic practices.

Surveys now show that most Americans distrust Big Tech companies, recognising their potential negative impact beyond the economy into societal impacts such as data breaches. According to a Pew Research Center survey, a majority of Americans support greater regulation of technology companies, reflecting bipartisan concerns about issues such as market manipulation and national security risks. This growing scepticism has fostered bipartisan support for increased antitrust action against tech giants. Notably, even conservative figures like Senator J.D. Vance have expressed support for FTC Chairwoman Lina Khan’s efforts to rein in companies like Amazon, highlighting a rare bipartisan consensus on the need to address Big Tech’s outsized influence.

As the EU moves forward with implementing its sweeping digital legislation during the next mandate, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), continued robust action by the US Federal Trade Commission would be immensely beneficial. The DMA introduces rules to prevent gatekeeper platforms from unfairly favouring their own services or misusing data collected from business users, while the DSA focuses on increasing transparency and accountability of online platforms, particularly with respect to content moderation and illegal content. A sustained New Brandeisian approach in the US could open avenues for increased transatlantic cooperation, particularly in addressing abuses by gatekeepers.

For example, joint discussions on remedies for issues such as Google’s advertising business could lead to more effective regulation and enforcement on both sides of the Atlantic, as a coalition of civil society organizations recently noted. The EU’s competition law cases against Google resulted in significant fines and behavioural remedies, but global coordination could increase the impact of such actions and enable more structural remedies. In addition, alignment on policy frameworks could facilitate the development of international standards for competition in the digital economy, setting precedents that could influence global markets.

Armoring Our Tech Backbone

The intersection of technology and security has become increasingly apparent in recent years, particularly in the wake of Russia’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has highlighted the critical role of digital technologies in modern warfare and geopolitical strategies. The crucial role played by technologies such as Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites, which provided essential internet connectivity to Ukrainian forces and civilians when traditional infrastructure was compromised, underscores that digital tools are not neutral; they can significantly influence geopolitical dynamics and outcomes on the ground. Moreover, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure have become a staple of modern conflicts, raising concerns about the resilience and security of digital networks.

Recognising this, the EU has created the new position of “Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy” in the incoming von der Leyen II Commission. This role will ensure that the EU can autonomously secure and manage its technological infrastructure, reduce dependence on external powers, and uphold democratic values in the digital space. Initiatives under this portfolio include investing in home-grown technologies and improving cybersecurity measures, for instance with respect to hospitals.

This heightened awareness of the interdependence between technology and society requires a renewed focus on securing the technology infrastructure. Revitalising the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) should be a priority. Established in 2021, the TTC served as a platform for the EU and the US to coordinate approaches to key global trade, economic, and technology issues and to deepen the transatlantic relationship based on shared democratic values. While the TTC has been criticised for being too high-level and not delivering enough concrete results – such as binding commitments – it has been instrumental in building people-to-people links across the Atlantic. These relationships are a crucial asset in challenging geopolitical times, facilitating mutual understanding when responding to sudden “black swan” events.

The TTC has already sparked collaborative efforts to build undersea data cables, addressing the urgent need for diversification to counter Chinese infrastructure advances and Russian sabotage. For example, projects such as the “EllaLink” cable between Europe and South America are reducing reliance on routes that pass through regions where data could be intercepted or influenced by hostile powers. Extending these efforts to secure and promote 5G and 6G networks is equally important. Both the EU and the US have expressed concerns about the use of equipment from companies such as Huawei and ZTE in critical networks due to potential security risks. In addition, cooperation on cloud technologies, in particular in setting joint standards for data security, privacy, and sovereignty, would further strengthen collective security. By working together on these fronts, the EU and the US can reduce the risks associated with technological dependencies and improve the resilience of their critical infrastructure.

Conclusion

As we await the results of the US election, it is clear that the EU must continue to focus on areas of common interest that transcend political divides. The challenges posed by digital monopolies and the vulnerabilities of technology infrastructure are not issues confined to one nation; they are global concerns that require coordinated responses. Cooperation could extend to joint research and development projects, coordinated responses to cyber incidents, and the establishment of transatlantic norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. Regardless of who holds the presidency, these areas offer fertile ground for cooperation that can strengthen the transatlantic bond.