The summer of 2026 will also be remembered in Europe as the season of diplomatic crises linked to migration flows. Following the clash in late July between Italy and Spain, which saw both countries temporarily suspend the Schengen agreement at their borders due to the influx of migrants into Ceuta — a situation that was subsequently resolved — it is now the turn of relations between Rome and Berlin. This time, the dispute concerns the so-called ‚Dublin cases‘ – migrants who, under European rules, are allowed to move freely to other EU countries where they apply for asylum, rather than being detained in the EU Member State of first entry to have their asylum claims assessed.

New pact, old rules

The new EU Regulation on the management of asylum and migration (AMMR) (EU 2024/1351), which entered into force on 12 June 2026 and replaced the old Dublin III Regulation, forms the cornerstone of the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum. It reaffirms the principle of the country of first entry whilst introducing a mandatory and flexible solidarity mechanism amongst Member States. In other words, so-called ’secondary movements‘ of migrants to countries other than their country of first entry remain prohibited. The new European framework therefore continues to allow countries hosting asylum seekers who arrived from other EU countries to return them to those Member States. The Dublin issue has long been a source of contention between Rome and Berlin. Although there are no verified figures, it is estimated that tens of thousands of asylum seekers who landed in Italy have moved to Germany in recent years without having their asylum claims recognised by the Italian authorities. For example, according to figures from Bild Zeitung in January 2025, Germany reportedly submitted requests to Italy for the return of 12,841 migrants in 2024 alone, but only three were actually returned. However, resistance to the return of Dublin cases has not come solely from Italy. Germany reportedly submitted 15,453 requests to Greece to take charge of migrants, of which only 219 were accepted and only 22 migrants were transferred. Similarly, only 3,297 of the 8,090 requests submitted by Germany to Bulgaria for the transfer of migrants are reported to have been accepted and only 290 carried out. Of the 14,068 requests submitted to Croatia, only 12,932 are reported to have been accepted and only 533 migrants transferred.

Showdown between Italy and Germany

In any case, Italy’s firm response to the events in Ceuta appears to have inspired Germany to announce its intention to transfer migrants who entered the EU via Italian borders and subsequently moved on to Germany to Italy. The first transfer is expected to involve Abdirisaq Warsame, a 22-year-old Somali national who arrived in Germany on 31 March 2026 after transiting through Italy. However, Rome has opposed her relocation, citing bilateral agreements with Berlin dating from December 2025, which consider secondary movements from Italy to Germany prior to 12 June 2026 — the date on which the new European legislation on migrants came into force — to be ‚regularised‘. However, Berlin does not agree with this interpretation and considers the request to relocate the Somali national to her country of first entry into the EU to be legitimate, even under the previous rules. In any case, the new resolve of Friedrich Merz’s government on this issue could pave the way for a cycle of large-scale relocations, potentially affecting all member states. Some are intent on relocating migrants to their respective countries of first entry into the EU. Others are required to take them back into their own asylum application assessment systems but are unlikely to fulfil such obligations without putting up a fight.

An example of this comes from Italy itself: upon hearing of the German Government’s intention to relocate ‘Italian’ Dublin cases, Rome not only questioned the timeframe within which this was to take place, but also argued that there must necessarily be ‘compensation’ that takes into account the migrants disembarked in Italy by NGO vessels flying the flags of European countries, a significant proportion of which are, in fact, German. Italy therefore invokes the responsibility of the country of origin of the vessel used by the NGO to transfer migrants rescued in the Mediterranean to Italian soil. In reality, according to Article 98 of the UNCLOS Convention (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention (Safety of Life at Sea) and the SAR Convention (Search and Rescue), all ships and their respective captains – including those operated by NGOs – have an absolute duty to render assistance to anyone in distress at sea, without discrimination, which entails disembarking the rescued shipwrecked persons at the nearest place of safety. The obligations of the so-called Flag States of humanitarian vessels operated by NGOs include the jurisdictional responsibility to ensure compliance with safety and maritime regulations on board, whilst international and maritime law does not impose an automatic obligation on them to admit migrants rescued in international waters or to process asylum applications in place of the coastal states of first arrival.

The threat of an anti-EU chain reaction over migrants

It is hard to believe that the Italian government is unaware of the extent of the responsibilities of flag states of NGO vessels. However, it is more likely that Rome is pursuing two objectives. Firstly, it is putting forward a purely political argument, which is not supported by current legislation, in an attempt to convince the domestic public that the possible return of migrants to Italy from the rest of Europe is a punitive measure imposed by other governments that fail to take into account supposed factual inequalities. Secondly, it is buying time in order to exploit the ‚loopholes‘ in the new European asylum management system. The new EU Pact stipulates that when a migrant moves from the country of first entry to another EU country, the latter may request that the former take the migrant back. Germany has already invoked this right. If the country of first entry does not contest this obligation within two weeks, the take-back notification is deemed confirmed. From that moment, a six-month period begins during which the migrant must be relocated. Once this period has elapsed without the migrant being transferred, the country of first entry is, in theory, free of obligations and responsibility for examining the ‘Dublin case’ asylum application falls to the country to which the migrant has moved. However, this time limit can be extended to up to twelve months if the migrant is detained, or up to eighteen months if they cannot be located or have absconded.

When the new EU Asylum Pact was approved, a number of European and national politicians praised the fact that it included a new, flexible solidarity system. Under this system, Member States must now help alleviate migratory pressure on one or more EU countries by taking in a quota of migrants, paying a financial contribution of around €20,000 per migrant not accepted, or providing resources and technical assistance to support those under pressure.

The tensions between Italy and Spain following the events in Ceuta, as well as the dispute between Rome and Berlin concerning ‚Dublinants‘, demonstrate that European solidarity on migration policies is, in reality, far from unanimous. Governments seem eager to frame the issue solely in terms of national interest, unaware that this endangers not only the European management of migration flows, which is fundamental to the current geopolitical balance, but also cooperative relations between Member States. If the solidarity mechanism for migrants were to grind to a halt due to mutual resistance and disputes, it would be extremely difficult to convince voters in the 27 Member States of the value of maintaining and revitalising the process of European integration. Given the numerous elections scheduled in various countries between 2026 and 2027, including Germany, Sweden, Latvia, France, Italy, Estonia, Finland, Austria, Spain, Greece, Slovakia and Poland, creating the impression that everyone is looking out for their own personal gain in Europe’s time of need would be a boon to those who want to see the European Union scaled back or even abolished. Therefore, setting aside the responsibilities of countries of first entry and those affected by secondary migrant movements, what is at stake here is the very future of the EU: acting – or re-acting – simply on the basis of current election polls does not seem a particularly wise strategy.

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