The Transatlantic Partnership Is Not Dead But...

January 2026 kept the world holding its breath. Never mind how historians will write about this period (that will depend on how we move on from here). From the American removal of Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela to speculations about a takeover of Greenland and strikes against the theocratic regime in Iran, events showed that it is still very much Washington that shapes world affairs.

Why Europeans Assume the Transatlantic Relationship Has Fundamentally Changed

Political commentators have written about a “new world” for quite some time now. When addressing the future of the transatlantic alliance, Europeans are in no doubt that the relationship has changed fundamentally. Metin Hakverdi, a German Member of the Bundestag for the Social Democrats and the German Government’s Transatlantic Coordinator, argued at Chatham House’s Strategic Choices Conference in Berlin on 2 December 2025 (during an “on the record” panel) that even if the Democrats were to win the next Presidential Election, nobody should expect that the Americans will go back to pre-Trump era political attitudes. Both in trade matters and in defence, the new world was here to stay.

This analysis is right, and the EU should pay heed to the corollaries that follow from it. While President Donald Trump’s speech at the Davos Economic Forum on 21 January 2026 and the walk back of his tariff threat that followed shortly after dissipated at least some of the worst fears about the state of the alliance, Europeans should not lose the sense of urgency that the past weeks created. Relations between Europe and the US will never be the same again.

American Public Opinion Tells a Different Story

Nonetheless, if you look at the state of American popular opinion, you get a picture that is at odds with a good deal of current European discussions. As far as the average American voter is concerned, the transatlantic glass is still half full, or at least not as empty as we might think.

For starters, Americans still predominantly rate the EU positively: 60 per cent take a favourable view of the bloc, with 37 per cent taking a negative view. While not stellar, these numbers are broadly comparable to the EU’s popularity in key member states such as France, Poland, Italy, and Spain taken in the same poll. Moreover, 75 per cent of Americans oppose the attempt to take control of Greenland according to a recent CNN poll, including 50 per cent of voters identifying as Republicans. An Ipsos poll that asked for support for a military invasion of Greenland showed that only 4 percent of Americans think this is a good idea.

Polls on questions of central importance to European (and, arguably, American) security show a consistent picture. The Reagan National Defense Survey suggests that 64 percent of Americans favour sending weapons to Ukraine, 9 percent more than a year before. 70 percent do not think that Russia can be trusted to honour a peace agreement with Ukraine. Moreover, 68 percent of respondents support NATO, the highest number obtained since the Reagan Survey started in 2018.

Europe’s Soft Power Remains a Strategic Asset

Crucially, these results show that Europe still has a trump card to play vis-à-vis the US: its soft power appeal towards the American public and key decision-makers. The fact that Americans largely hold positive views on key issues of shared transatlantic interest shows that the alliance is not dead. To say that it is either makes a claim about future developments (which we cannot know for sure), or it is a normative political statement. For now, the state of American public opinion suggests otherwise.

For what it’s worth, Trump is pursuing a deeply personal version of foreign policy. In addition to his own beliefs, the ideas and interests of his immediate surroundings shine through American policy. Whether these really align with the views of the American public as a whole is a non-trivial question.

For all the talk about a “new world” that we live in, there seemingly are few structural reasons to think that the shifts that we have seen since Trump took office again a year ago are irreversible. Yes, there are socio-economic changes that helped propel Trump into the White House, and these go a long way to explain his Administration’s protectionist trade policies. But these changes do not account for the ideas that surfaced in the new National Security Strategy the Administration published in December, which went out of its way to prioritize the Western Hemisphere in stark language reminiscent of Carl Schmitt. This is a document that is written by individuals who make choices in the very sense of the word. And choices and views can and do change.

Hard Power, Political Costs and Europe’s Remaining Leverage

All of this does not change the fact that Europe needs to double down on increasing its military capabilities. If the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not enough of a warning in the first place, now should be the time when sceptics finally change their mind.

Still, it is noteworthy that two traditional strengths helped to deter Trump from ultimate brinksmanship on the Greenland file. Firstly, the EU’s economic weight (with a total GDP of 19.5 trillion US dollars and constituting the US’ largest trade partner) was still enough to threaten the American economy with adverse consequences that would have been directly attributable to the President. Secondly, the EU still has a sufficiently positive reputation in the US to impose an incalculable political cost to a military (or otherwise) threat against its member states. The American public may be on board with removing a socialist dictator from power; infringing on the national sovereignty of its allies is an infinitely harder sell. Vice versa, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Donald Trump is sufficiently unpopular in Europe so that the political costs of opposing him are manageable for European leaders. And while the total number of European soldiers sent to Greenland may have been infinitesimal compared with the possible threat, critics miss the point that the deployment did not aim to impose military costs on a possible invader. Instead, the objective was to impose political costs. This is a fundamental difference to the European tripwire deployments to the Baltics and Romania, which are substantial enough to make a difference in the event of war. The fact that this worked so well for now has a lot to do with Europe’s continuing positive image in America.

Recognizing the need for further defence spending, the fact that its traditional strengths still go some way in high-stakes diplomacy should be a lesson that European leaders bear in mind. If nothing else, it is a lesson that underscores how powerful the EU still is in the new world, however different it may have become.

Marius Strubenhoff works as an independent expert on foreign and security policy. In this capacity, he works for the Centre for European Policy, where he reports on French EU policy and EU foreign policy issues. Previously, he headed the foreign and security policy department of the Berlin office of the European Leadership Network for several years and lectured at the University of Sheffield. Marius Strubenhoff was born and raised in Hamburg and has lived in Kyiv, London and Cambridge, among other places. He has been living in Paris since October 2025. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Cambridge and a master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science.